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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this case, arising under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA), the district court held that the 
defendant company breached the terms of the executive deferred 
compensation plan that it offered to its highly compensated 
employees.  Yet it also held that the appellants -- participants 
in that plan -- failed to prove they suffered any damages as a 
result of the breach.  We hold that the district court correctly 
decided both issues and therefore we will affirm its judgments. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Appellants John L. Kemmerer and James H. Jordan were 
high level executives of the defendant, ICI Americas Inc.0  ICI 
offered its employees the opportunity to participate in a number 
of benefit plans.  The dispute on appeal centers around its 
executive deferred compensation plan (the DEC plan), which like 
                                                           
0ICI Americas Inc. explains in its brief that it has changed its 
name to Zeneca Inc. and that the company now known as ICI 
Americas Inc. is an entirely different corporation which came 
into existence as a result of a reorganization of the business 
that began in late 1992.  Nevertheless, as a matter of 
convenience, we refer to the defendant as ICI. 
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all such plans is commonly referred to as a "top hat" plan. 
Specifically, ICI encouraged its high level executives to 
participate in the DEC plan, under which participants deferred 
receipt of a percentage of their income, and thus initially 
reduced their annual taxable income.  Although the DEC plan was 
unfunded, its participants were allowed to track or shadow 
investment portfolios available to participants of an ICI 
deferred contribution plan.  ICI would credit the participants' 
balances in the DEC plan as though the hypothetical investments 
actually had been made.  Appellants participated in the DEC plan. 
 An executive's account balance in the DEC plan became 
payable after the executive left ICI's employ.  The DEC plan 
permitted participants to elect the method of payment by which 
distributions would be made.  In this regard, the plan was 
amended on February 1, 1985, to state: 
Amounts deferred under this agreement shall 
be paid to Optionee commencing January 15 of 
the year following the year of his separation 
from service in five percentage installments 
. . . unless, prior to separation from 
service the Optionee files a written notice 
with the Secretary of Company, ('Secretary') 
requesting a different form of distribution. 
Such notice shall be treated as an election 
by the Optionee to receive payment by the 
method requested.  The method of distribution 
requested shall be irrevocable after the 
close of business on the date of Optionee's 
separation from service. 
 
Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 138, 139-40 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994).0  Pursuant to this provision, "Jordan elected to have 
                                                           
0We simplify our discussion of ICI's plans to encompass only what 
is relevant on appeal.  The district court's opinion discusses 
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his DEC benefits paid in specific annual amounts until the year 
2007.  Kemmerer elected to have his plan balance distributed in 
fixed annual amounts until such time as his account balance would 
be exhausted."  Id. at 140.  After Kemmerer and Jordan retired 
(in 1986 and 1989 respectively), ICI began distributing their 
benefits in accordance with their respective elections.  In 1991, 
however, ICI unilaterally decided to terminate the DEC plan.  At 
that point, rather than complying with its retired executives' 
elections, ICI decided to distribute their accumulated account 
balances in three annual installments, with 10% interest on the 
unpaid balances, to be paid in January 1992, January 1993, and 
January 1994.  ICI advised appellants of this change by letters 
dated November 29, 1991. 
 On October 16, 1992, after ICI made one payment on the 
new distribution schedule, appellants filed this action in the 
district court contending that, by terminating the DEC plan after 
their rights in it had vested, ICI breached its contractual 
obligations and thereby violated ERISA.  They requested monetary 
damages for the benefits lost as a consequence of ICI's breach of 
the plan.  In this litigation, they contend that the early 
termination of the plan had adverse tax consequences to them and 
required them to incur fees for financial management they 
otherwise would not have incurred.  They do not contend, however, 
that ICI did not pay them the full amount of their account 
balances.  Consequently, they are in the position, unusual if not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the various plans in greater detail.  See Kemmerer, 842 F. Supp. 
at 139-40. 
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unprecedented for plaintiffs, of suing for damages because they 
were paid money owed to them.  Eventually appellants and ICI 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment on liability, and ICI 
filed a motion for summary judgment on damages.  In an opinion 
filed on January 4, 1994, reported at 842 F. Supp. 138, the 
district court granted appellants' motion for summary judgment on 
liability, and denied ICI's motions on both liability and 
damages.  The court entered an order on January 5, 1994, in 
accordance with its opinion.   
 The district court held a nonjury damages trial in 
October 1994.  In an unreported memorandum opinion filed on 
December 22, 1994, the court rejected appellants' argument that 
ICI had the burden of proof and held that appellants had failed 
to prove that they suffered damages as a result of ICI's conduct. 
Accordingly, it entered a judgment in favor of ICI on December 
23, 1994.  On January 19, 1995, the parties stipulated, and the 
court ordered, that all claims except those for attorneys' fees 
and costs had been resolved.  The court stayed proceedings as to 
those items pending the completion of this appeal.  Both parties 
then filed appeals, appellants from the order of December 23, 
1994, and ICI from the order of January 5, 1994.   
 Arguably, we should dismiss ICI's appeal, as ICI could 
challenge the district court's finding of liability in this court 
as an alternative ground for us to affirm.  See Armotek Indus., 
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 759 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1991).  But we will not do so because appellants have filed a fee 
petition which, as we have indicated, the district court has 
6 
stayed pending disposition of this appeal.  Thus, even though we 
affirm on the damages issue, ICI may be aggrieved by the judgment 
on liability, because the district court may conclude that, on 
the basis of that judgment alone, it can award the appellants 
counsel fees.0  Of course, we express no opinion on this point. 
However, in view of ICI's success at trial on the damages issue, 
its appeal from the denial of its motion for summary judgment on 
damages is moot and we will not consider it.  See McDaniels v. 
Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 448 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995).  We have jurisdiction 
over appellants' appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
district court exercised diversity of citizenship and federal 
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and 29 U.S.C. 
§1132(e).   
 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Liability 
 We first consider whether the district court erred in 
concluding that ICI breached the terms of the DEC plan.  We 
exercise plenary review on this issue as the district court 
granted the appellants' motion for summary judgment.  See 
                                                           
0In theory, we could conclude that until such time as the 
district court enters an award of fees against ICI, if it does 
so, ICI has not been aggrieved by the liability judgment and that 
we therefore should dismiss its appeal.  However, we will not 
take that approach, as the liability issue has been briefed fully 
and, in any event, we can consider ICI's challenge on that issue 
as an alternative basis to affirm.  Furthermore, we think that 
resolution of the liability issue at this time may aid in 
concluding this case.  Of course, there is no doubt but that we 
have the power to consider the issue.  See United States v. Tabor 
Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 342-44 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1093, 112 S.Ct. 1167 (1992). 
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Petruzzi's IGA Supermarket, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 
F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993). 
 With the passage of ERISA, Congress set out to "assure 
the equitable character of employee benefit plans and their 
financial soundness."  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.2d, 553, 560 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (citing Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570, 105 
S.Ct. 2833, 2840 (1985)) (internal quotations and alterations 
omitted).  ERISA broadly defines the terms "employee pension 
benefit plan" and "pension plan" to include any plan established 
or maintained by an employer that, by its express terms: 
results in a deferral of income by employees 
for periods extending to the termination of 
covered employment or beyond, regardless of 
the method of calculating the contributions 
made to the plan, the method of calculating 
the benefits under the plan or the method of 
distributing benefits from the plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii).  Thus, top hat plans clearly are 
subject to ERISA.  Nonetheless, not every type of pension plan is 
subject to all of ERISA's stringent requirements.  Congress 
imposed strict regulations over plans whose participants and 
beneficiaries it most desired to protect -- employer-funded plans 
designed to secure employees' financial security upon retirement. 
ERISA imposes upon the trustees and sponsors of such plans strict 
fiduciary duties and standards of care and further provides for 
detailed disclosure and vesting requirements.  Top hat plans, 
however, which benefit only highly compensated executives, and 
largely exist as devices to defer taxes, do not require such 
8 
scrutiny and are exempted from much of ERISA's regulatory scheme. 
See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 930 n.7 
(3d Cir. 1985).0  In particular, top hat plans are not subject to 
certain vesting, participation, and fiduciary requirements.  Id. 
at 930-31.  But despite the exemption of top hat plans from many 
of ERISA's regulations, ERISA's enforcement provision clearly 
permits participants in top hat plans, as well as other covered 
plans, to bring civil actions "to enforce the substantive 
provisions of the Act or to recover benefits due or otherwise 
enforce the terms of the plan."  Id. at 935; see 29 U.S.C. 
§1132(1)(B) ("A civil action may be brought by a participant or 
beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his 
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to 
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the 
plan."). 
 Contrary to ICI's intimations, then, Congress' decision 
to exempt top hat plans from certain fiduciary standards does not 
mean that courts may not review their trustees' and sponsors' 
actions.  Rather, the exemption means only that they are not held 
to the strict fiduciary standards of loyalty and care otherwise 
applicable to ERISA fiduciaries.   
 In holding that ICI breached the terms of the plan, the 
district court appropriately applied contract principles.  As we 
                                                           
0We overruled Barrowclough insofar as it held that arbitration of 
statutory ERISA claims is precluded in Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993), but 
Barrowclough remains good law on the points for which we cite it 
here. 
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pointed out in Barrowclough, "this court has repeatedly 
considered claims for benefits by participants . . . that are 
based on the terms of or rights under a plan" even though such 
claims are based not on fiduciary duties but on "breach[es] of 
contract of an employee benefit plan."  Id. at 935-36.  Thus, in 
such instances, breach of contract principles, applied as a 
matter of federal common law, govern disputes arising out of the 
plan documents.  In determining how to apply these principles, 
the district court followed the analysis in Carr v. First 
Nationwide Bank, 816 F. Supp. 1476 (N.D. Cal. 1993), which held 
that top hat plans should be interpreted in keeping with the 
principles that govern unilateral contracts. 
 Applying those principles to ICI's DEC plan, the 
district court noted that the plan provides that "amounts 
deferred . . . shall be paid . . . in five percentage 
installments unless . . . the Optionee files a written notice 
with the Secretary of Company . . . , requesting a different form 
of distribution."  Kemmerer, 842 F. Supp. at 145.  Therefore, the 
court reasoned, when appellants complied with all the 
prerequisites to vesting they accepted the ICI's offer.  The plan 
terms then required ICI to fulfill its end of the bargain by 
making payments consistent with appellants' respective elections. 
 We agree.  "A pension plan is a unilateral contract 
which creates a vested right in those employees who accept the 
offer it contains by continuing in employment for the requisite 
number of years."  Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management Employee 
Sav. Plan, 920 F.2d 651, 661 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 
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marks omitted); Carr, 816 F. Supp. at 1488 ("[P]ension benefit 
plans are unilateral contracts which employees accept by 
appropriate performance.").  Thus, the plan constitutes an offer 
that the employee, by participating in the plan, electing a 
distributive scheme, and serving the employer for the requisite 
number of years, accepts by performance.  Under unilateral 
contract principles, once the employee performs, the offer 
becomes irrevocable, the contract is completed, and the employer 
is required to comply with its side of the bargain.  Accordingly, 
when a participant leaves the employ of the company, the trustee 
is "required to determine benefits in accordance with the plan 
then in effect."  Pratt, 920 F.2d at 661.  As a corollary, 
"[s]ubsequent unilateral adoption of an amendment which is then 
used to defeat or diminish the [employee's] fully vested rights 
under the governing plan document is . . . ineffective."  Id. 
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that after the 
appellants' rights had vested when they completed performance, 
ICI could not terminate the plan in the absence of a specific 
provision in the plan authorizing it to do so. 
 ICI seeks to avoid this result by arguing that the plan 
terms do not impede its ability to terminate the plan. 
Specifically, ICI objects to what it perceives to be the district 
court's overbroad holding -- that in order to retain the power to 
terminate a top hat plan a company explicitly must reserve the 
right to do so in the plan documents.  In the first place, ICI's 
argument is simply wrong after Barrowclough because it has no 
basis in contract law.  In addition, we find ICI's argument more 
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than minimally unfair.  As the Carr court recognized, even when a 
plan reserves to the sponsor an explicit right to terminate the 
plan, acceptance by performance closes that door under unilateral 
contract principles (unless an explicit right to terminate or 
amend after the participants' performance is reserved).  "Any 
other interpretation . . . would make the Plan's several specific 
and mandatory provisions ineffective, rendering the promises 
embodied therein completely illusory."  Carr, 816 F. Supp. at 
1494.  Thus, there is no presumption that an employer may 
terminate a top hat plan.  Rather, the plan should be interpreted 
under principles of contract law.   Consequently, a court must 
determine whether an employer has a right to terminate a plan by 
construing the terms of the plan itself. 
 ICI also contends that our result is incongruous 
because in its view we accord participants in unfunded plans more 
protection than participants in funded plans.  Although the cases 
applying unilateral contract principles generally involve funded 
rather than unfunded plans, we agree with the Carr court that the 
cases' "holdings . . . did not rely on ERISA's provisions," id. 
at 1488, but rather on principles of contract law.  Id., see also 
Pratt, 920 F.2d at 658.  Indeed, any other result would 
eviscerate our holding in Barrowclough that participants in 
unfunded deferred compensation plans may sue to enforce the terms 
of the plan under contract principles.   
 In this regard, ICI's reliance on Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1990), is misplaced.  In 
that case, we pointed out that "virtually every circuit has 
12 
rejected the proposition that ERISA's fiduciary duties attach to 
an employer's decision whether or not to amend an employee 
benefit plan."  Id. at 1161.  Of course, that only means that 
ERISA's fiduciary duties themselves do not per se "prohibit a 
company from eliminating previously offered benefits."  (Phillips 
v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1016, 107 S.Ct. 1893 (1987).  As one court has 
explained, "when an employer decides to establish, amend, or 
terminate a benefits plan, as opposed to managing any assets of 
the plan and administering the plan in accordance with its terms, 
its actions are not to be judged by fiduciary standards."  Musto 
v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1745 (1989); see also Carr, 816 
F. Supp. at 1489 ("[T]he rule that [funded] welfare benefit plans 
are freely amendable means that the amendment or termination of 
such plans is not governed by the fiduciary duty provisions of 
ERISA."). 
 But these cases do not say anything about the 
application of unilateral contract principles to an employer's 
actions in terminating a plan.  The fact that fiduciary standards 
are inapplicable "does not give employers carte blanche to amend 
welfare benefit plans where the plans themselves may be 
interpreted to provide that benefits are contractually vested or 
accrued."  Carr, 816 F. Supp. at 1489.  And, as we discussed 
above, those principles clearly apply after performance is 
complete and the participant's rights have vested.  Moreover, 
nothing in ERISA prohibits the parties from contracting to limit 
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the employer's right to amend or terminate a plan.  Indeed, the 
point of our holding in Barrowclough was to ensure that 
participants in ERISA plans have an ERISA-based right to sue 
under contract principles to enforce the terms of the plan.  As 
the district court reasoned, Congress exempted top hat plans from 
ERISA's vesting requirements in large part because it recognized 
that high level executives retain sufficient bargaining power to 
negotiate particular terms and rights under the plan and 
therefore do not need ERISA's substantive rights and protections. 
Kemmerer v. ICI, 842 F. Supp. at 144.  This being so, "'it would 
be absurd to deny such individuals the ability to enforce the 
terms of their plans in contract. . . .  [I]t would be difficult 
to imagine what Top Hat participants would have the power to 
obtain through negotiation or otherwise -- apparently not much 
more than illusory promises.'"  Id. (quoting Carr, 816 F. Supp. 
at 1492). 
 In this regard, ICI concedes that a plan provision that 
the plan's terms cannot be revoked is controlling.  See br. at 23 
("Ordinarily, plan sponsors have unfettered discretion to 
terminate pension plans, unless the plan documents provide to the 
contrary.").  This is just such a case.  In determining the 
actual terms of the plan, "ERISA plans, like contracts, are to be 
construed as a whole."  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 
967 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1992).  If the plan document is 
unambiguous, it can be construed as a matter of law. 
 The February 1, 1985 amendment to the plan, which we 
quote above, in no uncertain terms provides that a participant's 
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election of a particular method of payment is binding and 
irrevocable, and that it shall be complied with.  To conclude in 
the face of such language that ICI had unfettered discretion to 
disregard a participant's election would violate the plain 
meaning rule of contract interpretation.  See Duquesne Light Co. 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 613-16 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(discussing Pennsylvania common law rules of contract 
interpretation).  ICI contends that the language is at the very 
least ambiguous, and it points to extrinsic evidence tending to 
show that "the purpose of the amendment was to avoid the 
constructive receipt [tax] problem."  Reply br. at 4.0 
Furthermore, ICI contends that it terminated the plan because of 
its desire to protect the participants' unfunded balances and 
because of its concern that the tax deferral aspects of the plan 
might not survive the scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service. 
Yet these circumstances in no way can alter the contractual 
principles that lead to our conclusion that the terms of the plan 
bound ICI so that, in the absence of appellants' consent, ICI 
could not change its method of payment.  The district court, 
therefore, correctly held that ICI violated the terms of the 
plan. 
 
B.  Damages 
                                                           
0Constructive receipt in this context refers to a situation in 
which participants exercise such a degree of control over plan 
assets so as to be deemed to have received the deferred income. 
In such cases, the income deferred could be considered taxable 
immediately. 
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 After granting summary judgment to the appellants on 
liability, the district court found that appellants had failed to 
prove that ICI's termination of the plan damaged them. Appellants 
characterized their claim for damages as falling under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B), which permits plan participants to sue to 
recover benefits due them under the plan, and 29 U.S.C. 
§1132(a)(3), which permits a participant to bring a civil action 
"to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce 
any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan."  
 In addressing the parties' summary judgment motions, 
the district court rejected ICI's argument that the damages 
appellants sought constituted unrecoverable extracontractual 
damages.  Kemmerer v. ICI, 842 F. Supp. at 146.  ICI contends 
that the district court erred in that determination.  The 
question ICI raises is difficult, requiring a close examination 
of precisely what damages appellants seek.  In Massachusetts Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 3091 
(1985), the Court noted that "the statutory provision explicitly 
authorizing a beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his 
rights under the plan -- § [1132(a)(1)(B)] says nothing about the 
recovery of extracontractual damages."  And in Mertens v. Hewitt 
Assocs., 113 S.Ct. 2071-72, 2068 (1993), the Court held that the 
provision for equitable relief in section 1132(a)(3) does not 
allow the recovery of monetary damages.  In In re Unisys Corp., 
57 F.3d 1255, 1267-68 (3d Cir. 1995), we held that an individual 
participant may sue on his or her own behalf to recover equitable 
relief under section 1132(a)(3), and characterized reimbursements 
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of back benefits as "remedies which are restitutionary in nature 
and thus equitable."  Id. at 1269 (citing Curcio v. John Hancock 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 238-39 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 We are inclined to agree with ICI that appellants' 
claims are for extracontractual damages for purposes of section 
1132(a)(1)(B) and monetary damages for purposes of section 
1132(a)(3) and thus are not cognizable claims under ERISA.  After 
all, the possibly adverse tax ramifications of the plan 
termination and the financial management fees which appellants 
may incur are possible consequences of the breach.  On the other 
hand, the plan required ICI to pay money, and by its payment of 
their account balances to the appellants, ICI satisfied that 
obligation, though it did so prematurely.  Further, it is 
difficult for us to see how such damages can be regarded as 
claims for equitable relief under section 1132(a)(3).  But be 
that as it may, we decline to resolve such intricate issues of 
ERISA law because appellants failed at trial to prove they were 
damaged at all.0 
 In the first instance, we reject appellants' argument 
that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on 
them.  They rely on the proposition that when the existence of 
damage is clear, damages should not be denied simply because it 
is difficult to quantify the amount of loss.  As a corollary, 
appellants argue that after they have proved they have been 
damaged, the district court cannot rely on burden of proof 
                                                           
0Appellants concede that they can advance damage claims only 
under ERISA. 
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principles to reject their damages claims outright.  For this 
proposition they rely on Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 
U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187 (1946).  But in that Fair Labor Standards 
Act case, the Court assumed that "the employee has proved that he 
has performed work and has not been paid in accordance with the 
statute."  Id. at 688, 66 S.Ct. at 1193.  As the Court noted, 
"[t]he damage is therefore certain.  The uncertainty lies only in 
the amount of damages arising from the statutory violation by the 
employer."  Id.  Here, the opposite is true -- the very existence 
of damages is in dispute.  ICI presented persuasive evidence that 
appellants had not suffered any damages.  When the very issue of 
damages is the subject of a good faith dispute, the principle 
that "'it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of 
justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby 
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts'" simply 
does not apply.  Id. (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson 
Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S.Ct. 248, 250 (1931)). 
 Nor are we moved by appellants' contention that the 
burden should shift simply because this is an ERISA case.  To be 
sure, courts have, in certain ERISA cases, placed the burden of 
proof on the trustee of the plan.  But those cases involved 
first, the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, and second, a 
definite loss.  For instance, in Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660 
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 979 (1993), the court 
held that "once the ERISA plaintiff has proved a breach of 
fiduciary duty and a prima facie case of loss to the plan or ill-
gotten profit to the fiduciary, the burden of persuasion shifts 
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to the fiduciary to prove that the loss was not caused by, or his 
profit was not attributable to, the breach of duty."  Id. at 671. 
Neither of the prerequisites to burden-shifting is present here. 
 Turning to the evidence of damages, we are troubled by 
the fact that appellants, though claiming they were aggrieved by 
the plan termination, failed to request equitable relief 
requiring ICI to comply with the plan terms.  Even though ICI 
advised them in November 1991 that it was changing the 
distribution schedule, they brought this action almost one year 
later, and only after ICI made one payment to them, and they 
filed a motion for summary judgment only after ICI made two of 
the accelerated payments.  Yet section 1132(a)(3) explicitly 
authorizes participants to bring civil actions "to enjoin any act 
. . . which violates . . . the terms of the plan" and "to obtain 
. . . equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the 
plan."  Surely, if appellants really felt that ICI had injured 
them, they could have rejected the accelerated payments and 
sought injunctive relief enforcing the terms of the plan.  Given 
the circumstances, it seems obvious that appellants sought to 
play a no-lose game -- trying to capitalize on the freed-up funds 
but claiming damages based on utterly speculative projections as 
to the financial consequences had the plan not been terminated. 
 Indeed, appellants' projections of damages at the trial 
were so speculative as to be unascertainable.  First, they 
contended that they suffered tax-related losses because they were 
forced immediately to pay taxes on the accelerated payments to 
them and thereby forgo the benefits of tax deferral.  Standing 
19 
alone there would be force to this argument because ordinarily 
from a taxpayer's viewpoint it is advantageous to defer the 
payment of taxes.  Yet the existence of such damages depends in 
part on what the tax rate will be at any given time and thus is 
speculative.  And, as ICI properly points out, by virtue of the 
plan termination the appellants' account balances were taxed at a 
much lower rate than would have been the case had payments been 
made several years later.  Furthermore the tax consequences of 
the accelerated payments were simply part of a larger picture 
including investment rates of return which the district court 
concluded did not establish that appellants had suffered or would 
suffer any financial loss as a result of the acceleration of 
payments. 
 Second, the appellants contended that they incurred 
management fees and transactions costs as a result of the breach. 
But ICI presented evidence that appellants "can replicate the 
investment options under [the] DEC without incurring material 
transaction costs."  Op. at 6.  The district court credited this 
testimony and concluded that "I cannot find . . . that it is more 
likely true than not that plaintiffs will now incur either 
material transactions costs or management fees."  Op. at 6-7. The 
district court's finding is certainly supported by the record. 
 Most significantly, appellants' expert did not take 
into account the risk involved in keeping money in an unfunded 
plan.  The district court pointed out that "[a]ny evaluation of 
one's interest in an unfunded plan must . . . give some 
consideration to the fact that there is a risk to the participant 
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that there will be no funds and the value of his interest in the 
plan should be adjusted to reflect that risk."  Op. at 6.  The 
failure to take the risk into account not only called all of 
appellants' projections into question, but is itself a reason for 
denying damages because a conclusion that they were damaged would 
rest on insupportable speculation.0  In light of all of these 
factors, we cannot say that the district court's conclusion that 
appellants failed to prove that they were damaged was clearly 
erroneous.  Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d 
Cir. 1993).0  Thus, we cannot find that they were entitled to 
relief in this case.0 
 
Conclusion 
 For the reasons detailed above, we will affirm the 
district court's judgment of December 23, 1994, in favor of ICI 
and its order of January 5, 1994, granting appellants summary 
judgment on liability, and we will dismiss as moot ICI's appeal 
from the order of January 5, 1994, to the extent that the order 
denied ICI summary judgment on damages. 
                                                           
0Thus, we reject appellants' argument that the district court 
failed to make adequate findings. 
0The conclusion we expressed above that ICI's concern about the 
security of the participants' accounts in the DEC plan did not 
justify its termination of the plan, does not mean that the 
security factor cannot be considered in a damages calculation. 
0We realize that in some situations a wronged plaintiff may 
recover nominal damages without proof of actual injury.  See 
e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054 
(1978).  We see no reason, however, to apply that principle here 
as we do not regard the right which appellants seek to vindicate 
as worthy of such special protection. 
